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Abstract
The Generalized Second Price auction (GSP) has been widely used by search
engines to sell ad slots. Previous studies have shown that the pure Price Of Anarchy
(POA) of GSP is 1.25 when there are two ad slots and 1.259 when three ad slots.
For the cases with more than three ad slots, however, only some untight upper
bounds of the pure POA were obtained. In this work, we improve previous results
in two aspects: (1) We prove that the pure POA for GSP is 1.259 when there
are four ad slots, and (2) We show that the pure POA for GSP with more than
four ad slots is also 1.259 given the bidders are ranked according to a particular
permutation.
1 Introduction
The Generalized Second Price auction (GSP), a generalization of the Vickrey auction,
is the primary method used by search engines to sell online ad slots. With GSP, ad-
vertisers compete for several ad slots with decreasing click-through rates (CTR) by
submitting bids to the search engine. Ad slots are assigned to advertisers according
to the descending order of their bids (ad-specific CTR is also considered in practice)
and each advertiser pays an amount of money if his/her ad is clicked according to the
second-price rule.
GSP has drawn a lot of attention from the academic community. For example, the
pure Price of Anarchy (POA) of GSP has been extensively studied. Leme and Tardos
[2] exhibited the weakly feasible condition and obtained an upper bound of 1.618 for
the pure POA of GSP. They also proved that the pure POA equals 1.25 when there are
exactly two ad slots. Caragiannis et al. [1] improved the upper bound (for any number
of ad slots) to 1.282 based on the same condition. Lucier and Leme [3] extended Leme
and Tardos results and proved that the pure POA is also 1.259 when there are three ad
slots. However, for the case with more than three ad slots, no tighter bounds for the
pure POA of GSP have been derived, as far as we know. The motivation of this work
is just to look into this issue, and advance the state of the art.
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2 Preliminaries
Consider GSP auctions with n advertisers and n ad slots. Denote v = (v1, v2, · · · vn)
as the advertisers’ value vector, where vi is the value of the i-th advertiser. Denote
α = (α1, α2, · · ·αn) as the click-through rate (CTR) of ad slots, where αj corresponds
to the CTR of the j-th slot. Without loss of generality, we assume 1 = v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥
vn ≥ 0 and 1 = α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αn ≥ 0. Given bid vector b = (b1, b2, · · · bn),
we can obtain a permutation pi = (pi1, pi2, · · · , pin) of advertisers according to the
descending order of their bids, where pi(k) is the index of the advertiser with the k-th
highest bid. Following the common practice [1, 3, 2], all advertisers are assumed to be
conservative, i.e., ∀i, bi ≤ vi.
Given the above notations, the pure POA of GSP with n ad slots can be defined as
follows,
POAn = max
v,α
max
b∈N (v,α)
∑n
i=1 αivi∑n
i=1 αivpi(i)
,
where N (v,α) is the set of the pure Nash equilibrium bid vectors given v and α. We
further define the pure POA of a given permutation pi with n ad slots as:
POAn(pi) = max
v,α
max
b∈N (v,α,pi)
∑n
i=1 αivi∑n
i=1 αivpi(i)
,
where N (v,α, pi) is the set of the pure Nash equilibrium bid vectors admitting the
permutation pi given v and α. It is not difficult to get POAn = maxpi∈Ωn POAn(pi),
where Ωn is the set of permutations of length n admitting pure Nash Equilibria.
3 Pure POA of GSP when n = 4
The following theorem shows that when n = 4, the pure POA of GSP equals 1.259.
Theorem 1. POA4 = 1.259.
Proof. First, we prove POA4(pi) ≤ 1.259 by enumerating all possible pi’s. Here
we only give the details for one permutation pi = (2, 3, 1, 4). The proofs for other
permutations are just similar.
For the pure POA of the permutation pi = (2, 3, 1, 4), we have POA4(pi) ≤
maxv,α f(v,α, pi), where f(v,α, pi) = α1v1+α2v2+α3v3+α4v4α1v2+α2v3+α3v1+α4v4 . It can be verified that
∂f(v,α)
∂v4
< 0. So f(v,α) ≤ f(v,α)|v4=0 and POA4(pi) ≤ maxv,α α1v1+α2v2+α3v3α1v2+α3v1+α3v3 .
Since v4 = 0 now, we have b4 = 0, and then (b1, b2, b3) is a Nash equilibrium of
the game restricted to advertiser 1, 2 and 3. The right-hand-side of the above equation
should be no larger than POA3 which is 1.259 [1, 3].
Second, we can use the following example to show POA4(pi) ≥ 1.259, and there-
fore prove POA4(pi) = 1.259. Suppose α1 = 1, α2 = 0.55, α3 = α4 = 0.47, v1 =
1, v2 = 0.53, v3 = 0.15, v4 = 0, b1 = 0, b2 = 0.53, b3 = 0.15, b4 = 0. It is easy
to verify that the bid vector together with the value and CTR vector compose a Nash
equilibrium and its efficiency is 1.259.
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Remark: Please note that the proof technique we use here is different from those
used by previous works [2, 1, 3]. The previous works basically leverage the weakly
feasible condition [2] to upper bound the pure POA: instead of directly finding the
worst efficiency of all Nash equilibrium permutations, they use the worst efficiency of
all permutations satisfying the weakly feasible condition as a bound. The following
example shows that the upper bound obtained by using the weakly feasible condition
as done in these previous works cannot be tight for n = 4.
Example Assume there are 4 advertisers in a GSP auction. Consider value vector
(1.00, 0.53, 0.25, 0.16) and slot CTR vector (1.00, 0.57, 0.47, 0.19). Permutation pi =
(2, 3, 1, 4) satisfies the weakly feasible condition, and its efficiency 1.269. Therefore,
the upper bound obtained from the weakly feasible condition is at least 1.269. Note
that we have proved POA4 = 1.259, thus this upper bound cannot be tight.
4 Pure POA for n > 4
Although we can prove POA4 = 1.259 by enumerating all possible Nash equilibrium
permutations, this approach is difficult to generalize to the cases with more ad slots.
This is because there are simply too many permutations to enumerate.
[3] provided a possible approach to prove the pure POA for any n ≥ 3 based on a
conjecture and a lemma: The conjecture states that the permutationpin = (2, 3, ..., n, 1)
is the worst one in terms of pure POA among the permutations of lengthn: POAn(pin) ≥
POAn(σn), ∀σn ∈ Ωn and the lemma states thatPOAn(pin) = 1.259 forPOAn(pin) ≤
1.259 and n ≥ 3. However, we find that their proof of the result is non-rigorous (if not
mistaken): In particular, the key inequality used in their proofs, x+av
y+bv ≤
x+av′
y+bv′ given
a ≤ b and v ≥ v′, is incorrect; to guarantee the correctness of the inequality, a further
condition x
y
≥ a
b
is required. In this paper, we give a rigorous proof to this lemma,
which is based on very different techniques from those used in [3].
Theorem 2. Given a permutationpin = (2, 3, ..., n, 1)where n ≥ 3, we havePOAn(pin) ≤
1.259, and the bound is tight.
Proof. We prove the result for n ≥ 5 by induction and contradiction, since the result
has been obtained for n = 3 and n = 4 (see Theorem 1). Assume that the result holds
for 3 ≤ n ≤ k − 1, and by contradiction POAk(pik) > 1.259.
Let f(α, v, pik) = α1v1+α2v2+···+αkvkα1v2+α2v3+···+αkv1 . Since f(α, v, pik) > 1, it can be verified
that ∀2 ≤ i ≤ k, ∂f(α,v,pik)
∂vi
< 0. The constraints that v2 must satisfy are v2 ≥ v3 and
v2 ≥ (1−
αk
α1
)v1. To reach the maximalPOAk(pik), either v2 = v3 or v2 = (1−αkα1 )v1.
There are three possible cases for the relationship between v2 and v3.
Case 1: v2 = v3 > (1−
αk
α1
)v1
Because (1 − αk
α2
)v1 ≤ (1 −
αk
α1
)v1 < v3, we have v3 = v4. Similarly we get
v2 = v3 = · · · = vk = (1 −
αk
αk−1
)v1 ≤ (1−
αk
α1
)v1, which leads to a contradiction.
Case 2: v2 = v3 = (1−
αk
α1
)v1
If α1 6= α2, we have v3 = v4 = · · · = vk = (1 − αkαk−1 )v1 < (1 −
αk
α1
)v1, which
leads to a contradiction.
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If α1 = α2, we can eliminate slot α2 and bidder v2 simultaneously and obtain
POAk(pik) ≤ POAk−1(pik−1), which leads to a contradiction.
Case 3: v2 > v3
Now we need to consider v3 and v4. Similarly, there are three possible cases for the
relationship between v3 and v4; one can discuss the three cases seperately, and for the
third case one needs to dig into the relationship between v4 and v5 recursively. Doing
so we have
f(α, v, pik) =
∑k
i=1 αi − αk
∑k−1
i=1
αi+1
αi
∑k
i=1 αi − (k − 1)αk
. (1)
By standard techniques, we get (1) f(α, v, pik) ≤
∑
k−1
i=1
αi+1
αi
+
α
k
α
k−1
−1
k−2 ≤
k−1
k−2λ
and (2) f(α, v, pik) ≤ k−(k−1)λk−(k−1) = k − (k − 1)λ, where λ = 1k−1
∑k−1
i=1
αi+1
αi
and
0 < λ < 1. Thus, POAk(pik) ≤ maxα,v f(α, v, pik) ≤ min{k−1k−2λ, k − (k − 1)λ} ≤
1.25, ∀n ≥ 5, which leads to another contradiction.
Combing the above three cases, we proved that POAn(pin) ≤ 1.259. Further, we
can construct an example to show the tightness of the bound by extending the example
used in the proof of Theorem 1: ∀4 ≤ k ≤ n, αk = 0.47, vk = 0, bk = 0.
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